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ENTRY
This matter came on for hearing before the oil and Gas
Board of Review (the "Board") upon timely notice of appeal filed
herein under date of August 12, 1992, by the Appellants appealing
from an order of the Chief of the Division of oil and Gas (the
"Chief") denying a request by Appellants for a mandatory pooling
order.

(See "Chief's Order" attached hereto as Appendix 1).

This matter was submitted to the Board upon the aforementioned
notice of appeal and evidence presented at a hearing before the
Board on October 22, 1992 at the offices of the Department of
Natural Resources, 4435 Fountain Square, Columbus, Ohio.

I.

Findings of Fact
1.

The Chief's Order 92-216 is an Order denying the

request of Appellants Transcontinental oil & Gas, Inc. and Cutter
oil company for mandatory pooling under Section 1509.27 of the
Ohio Revised Code.
2.

During 1991, Appellants contacted landowners in

Bath Township of summit County, Ohio to obtain non-drilling and
drilling leases for the purpose of forming a unit upon which an
oil and gas well could be drilled to a depth of approximately
3,900'.

Of the landowners contacted, only eight were willing to

grant such leases:

Cross and Maria D. DiTommaso; James V. and

Donna J. McCann; Anthony Olivo; steven C. and Janice A.
Brandvoid; Patrick H. and Diana s. McCullum; Salvatore J. and
Karen L. Cicerello; Daniel J. Vargo; and Gillum Doolittle Trust.
3.

In November, 1991 permit no. 2736 was issued for

the drilling
of the DiTommaso No.1 Well (the "Well"), which was
,
to be drilled on the voluntary unit formed by the Appellants (the
"DiTommaso Unit").
4.

One non-drilling lease included in the DiTommaso

unit was obtained (a lease for 13.48 acres) from Richard S.
Amundsen, Vice President of National city Bank and Trustee of the
Gillum H. Doolittle Trust (the "Doolittle Lease").

The entire

acreage included in the Doolittle Lease underlies Interstate 77.
Prior to obtaining the Doolittle Lease from Mr. Amundsen,
Appellants had received a certificate of title indicating
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ownership of the Doolittle property covered by the Doolittle
Lease was held by the Doolittle Trust of which Mr. Amundsen was
the trustee.
5.

At the time Appellants applied for their drilling

permit, when such permit was issued and when they drilled,
Appellants believed they had full interest in a voluntarily
pooled unit.

They had no reason to believe that mandatory

pooling was needed.
6.

In February, 1992, Appellants commenced the

drilling of the Well.

When Appellants had drilled three quarters

of the way to total depth, they were notified by National City
Bank that it had concerns regarding its authority to grant the
Doolittle Lease.
7.

Those parties filing appearances in Appeal No. 510

as interested parties, Bruce Doolittle and Philene Engle
("Interested parties"), had asserted they owned an interest in
the Doolittle property and challenged the authority of the
•
Trustee to grant the Doolittle Lease.
8.

Appellants completed drilling of the Well to total

depth (approximately 3,900') and set casing in the Well to
protect it.

Appellants delayed completion of the Well until they

could resolve the dispute regarding the Doolittle Lease.
9.

The location of the Well is less than 300' feet

from the boundary of the Doolittle Lease.
10.

Appellants made several attempts to obtain a lease

from the Interested Parties and to voluntarily pool the interests
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claimed by the Interested Parties in the Doolittle Lease.

These

offers included payment of $5,000 to each Interested Party as a
signing bonus for a lease of their asserted rights in the
Doolittle Lease and decreasing the total acreage which would be
included in a voluntary unit.

The decrease in total acreage in

the voluntary unit would effectively increase the Doolittle
royalty share of the unit.
11.

All offers presented to the Interested Parties

were rejected.
12.

Upon failure to obtain a lease or voluntary

pooling from the Interested Parties, the Appellants filed a
request for a mandatory pooling order with the Division.

At the

time the Appellants' request for a mandatory pooling order was
filed, the Well was drilled to total depth and casing was set.
Further, Appellants were "owners" as defined in Chapter 1509.
The mandatory pooling application filed by Appellants requested
inclusion of 3.067 acres located in the southernmost portion of
\

the Doolittle property, which was the minimum acreage needed from
the Doolittle Lease to make the unit of sufficient shape to
create a legal drilling unit.
13.

The request for a mandatory pooling order was

heard by the Technical Advisory Committee ("TAC") of the Division
on June 15, 1992.
14.

The TAC recommended to the Chief that the request

for mandatory pooling be approved with the following provisions:
i) the Doolittle acreage pool portions be comprised of 3.067
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acres; ii) the unit size be limited to and not exceed 24 acres in
total size; and iii) the standard pay-out provision of 150% cost
recovery be used.
15.

On July 29, 1992, the Chief denied Appellants

request for mandatory pooling.
16.

The appeal of Chief's Order 92-16 was timely filed

by Appellants.

II.

Issues Presented
The following questions were presented for

consideration by the Board:
1.

Is the Chief's Order denying Appellants'

application for a mandatory pooling order for drilling unit
requirements for the drilling of the Ditommaso No. 1 Well lawful
and reasonable?
2.

In the event the Chief's Order is unlawful and

unreasonable, and therefore should be vacated, is there an order
that this Board will make?

III. The Applicable Law
In determining whether the Chief's Order is lawful and
reasonable, this Board must consider whether such Order is in
accordance with the law and whether there is a valid factual
foundation for such Order.

See, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.

Maynard, 22 Ohio App.3d 3 (Franklin County ct. App. 1984).
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Addressing first whether the Chief's Order is in
accordance with the law, this Board in Jerry Moore. Inc. v. state
of Ohio, Appeal No. 1 (Ohio oil and Gas Board of Review, 1966)
established two conditions precedent under ORC 1509.27 for an
owner to make application to the Division of oil and Gas for a
mandatory pooling order: i) that a tract of land of insufficient
size or shape to meet the requirements for drilling a well
thereon as provided in ORC 1509.24 or 1509.25 exists; and ii) the
owner has been unable to form a drilling unit under agreement
provided in ORC 1509.26, on a just and equitable basis.

Id. at

16.
section 1509.24 of the Ohio Revised Code provides that
the Chief may adopt rules relative to minimum acreage and
distance requirements for drilling units.

section 1501:9-1-

04(C) (3) of the Ohio Administrative Code requires that a well
drilled to a depth of two thousand to four thousand feet must be
drilled on a unit containing no less than 20 acres, may be no
closer than 600 feet from any well drilled, producing or capable
of producing from the same pool and may be no closer than 300
feet from any boundary of the subject drilling unit.

If the

Doolittle Lease is not included, the existing borehole would not
be 300' from the boundary.

Therefore, the unit would be of

insufficient shape.
The Interested Parties submitted evidence that the
DiTommaso unit contained a location other than where the Well was
drilled which would comply with the requirements of §1501:9-1-6-

04.

This evidence, however, ignored that the Well was in fact

drilled and was drilled in good faith belief that the Appellants
owned the Doolittle Lease.

without the inclusion of some portion

of the Doolittle Lease, the Well does not meet the spacing
requirements of §§1509.24 and 1501:9-1-04.

Thus, Appellants'

application for mandatory pooling met the first condition
precedent.
Appellants presented testimony that they offered to
lease and/or voluntarily pool the mineral rights which the
Interested Parties asserted they owned.

Such offers included

leasIng or unitizing the entire 13.8 acres with payment of a
$5,000 lease bonus to each Interested Party, royalty payments in
the event of a lease or production payments and a right to
participate in the Well in the event of a voluntary pooling.

The

offers also provided for a revision of the DiTommaso unit to
retain the entire 13.8 acres in the Doolittle property while
reduc.ing the total acreage in the Unit, thereby increasing the
share of royalty payment for the Doolittle property.

The

Interested Parties presented no evidence as to why they believed
these offers were not just and equitable.
This Board has previously addressed the "reasonable
efforts" required to voluntarily pool prior to an application for
mandatory pooling.

The Board stated "[u]sing "all reasonable

efforts" contemplates both a reasonable offer and sufficient
efforts to advise the other owner or owners of same."
Moore, Inc. at 19.

Jerry

Based upon the testimony and other evidence
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and the findings set forth herein, this Board is of the opinion
that Appellants did make all reasonable efforts to voluntarily
pool, and therefore, complied with the second condition precedent
to make application to the Division for a mandatory pooling
order.
Once the conditions precedent have been met, the Chief
is to issue the mandatory pooling order, if he is satisfied the
application is in proper form and mandatory pooling is necessary
to protect correlative rights or to provide effective
development, use or conservation of oil and gas.

Correlative

rights is defined in §1509.01 as the reasonable opportunity to
recover oil and gas under tracts without having to drill
unnecessary wells or incur unnecessary expense.

The Chief

testified that wells in existence around the Well would deplete
the resources of the tract at issue.

The mandatory pooling

application requested inclusion of 3.067 acres in the
southernmost portion of the Doolittle property.

That acreage is

the minimum necessary to make the existing Well a legal unit.

It

also leaves 10 contiguous acres which could be pooled by the
owners of the Doolittle property to comprise half of another 20
acre unit.

Therefore, the mandatory pooling order recommended by

the TAC protects and maximizes both the Appellants and Interested
Parties correlative rights.

If mandatory pooling is not allowed,

Appellants, as "owners" of the tracts (as defined in §1509.01),
will not have the opportunity to recover oil and gas under their
tracts without drilling unnecessary wells or at unnecessary
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expense.

Therefore, the Appellants correlative rights will be

harmed without the mandatory pooling.
Appellee and the Interested Parties raised the argument
that a request for mandatory pooling must be made at the time of
application for the permit to drill.

Appellee's witness

testified that when a well which originally met all spacing
requirements is to be deepened and such deepening will result in
additional spacing requirements, mandatory pooling may be used if
needed to meet the new spacing requirements.

The purpose of

mandatory pooling is to promote effective use of our state's
natural resources and to protect the correlative rights of all
interested parties.
These Appellants believed they had proper leases.
Appellants exercised due diligence of a reasonably prudent
operator by confirming that belief with a title opinion.

Thus,

the site selection of the Well, when drilled, was reasonable and
prude~t.

After material resources had been committed to the

Well, a previously unknown interestholder refused numerous and
reasonable offers to lease or be pooled.

Without a grant of

mandatory pooling, that refusal would cause the other interested
parties economic loss and loss of correlative rights.

These

Appellants have as much economic and logistic difficulties as an
applicant who would be deepening a well.

To distinguish the fact

of this case from a "deepening" case would be an arbitrary and
unreasonable distinction.
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IV.

Order
Based upon the applicable law and the facts submitted

and giving due consideration to conservation and correlative
rights as applicable in this Appeal, the Board hereby makes the
following order:
i)

The Board vacates Chief's Order No. 92-216 and finds
that such Order was unlawful and unreasonable.

ii)

The Board makes the followinq order which it finds the
Chief should have made:
The Chief shall issue a mandatory poolinq order in
compliance with the recommendations of the TAC
effective as of the date of execution by the Chief.
Such order shall include the followinq exception: the
sharinq of production and adjustment of the oriqinal
costs of drillinq, equippinq and completinq the Well
shall be from the effective date of the mandatory
poolinq order issued.

This Entry and Order effective this 20th day of January,
1994.

recused due to conflict
Benita Kahn, Secretary

012094/00290229
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true copy of
the foregoing was served on Kenneth Gibson, 234 Portage Trail,
P.O. Box 535, CUyahoga Falls, Ohio

44222, Mr. Ray Studer,

Division of oil and Gas, 4435 Fountain Square, Bldg. A, Columbus,
Ohio

43224 and Daniel Plumly, P.O. Box 488, 225 North Market

Street, Wooster, Ohio
prepaid, this

44691-0488 by certified mail, postage

JIst day

of January, 1994.

~&
Benita Kahn

012194/00290229
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BEFORE THE OIL AND GAS BOARD OF REVIEW
DIVISION OF OIL AND GAS
STATE OF OHIO
TRAKSCONTINENTAL OIL &
GAS, IKC., et a1.

)

Appellants
vs.
DONALD L. MASON, CHIEF
DIVISION OF OIL AND GAS
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES

Appellee
Now

comes

Bruce

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

APPEAL NO. 510
Chief's Order 92-216

NOTICE OF APPEAL BY
INTERESTED PARTIES
TO COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO

)

Doolittle

and

Philene

Engel

"the

'interested parties" in the proceedings below and hereby give
notice of their appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, Franklin
County, Ohio from the decision of the Oil and Gas Board of
Review in Appeal No. 510 reversing the decision of the Chief of
the Division of Oil and Gas and granting the Appellants
application for Mandatory pooling.

I

The order was issued and

effective as of January 20, 1994 and this appeal is timely
made.
ASSOCIATED
LAW OFFICES
WEICK. GIBSON & LOWRY
234 WEST PORTAGE TRAIL
CUYAHOGA FALLS. OHIO
44221
(216) 929-0507

This appeal is on both questions of law and fact and is

made pursuant to Ohio Revised Code 1509.37.

The Board is requested to prepare and file a complete
record of its proceedings within 15 days as required by law.
WEICK, GIBSON & LOWRY

By:

.~

KENNETH L. GIBSON
Attorney for Interested Parties
1. D. *0018885
234 Portage Trail
P.O. Box 535
Cuyahoga Falls, OH 44222
(216) 929-0507

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing motion was sent this
25th day of January, 1994 to the following:
Donald L. Mason
Chief Division of Oil and Gas
Dept. of Natural Resources
4435 Fountain Square, Bldg A.
Columbus, Ohio 43224-1387
Ray Studer
Asst. Attorney General
Attorney for Appellant
4435 Fountain Square
Bldg A
Columbus OH 43224

Daniel H. Plumly
Attorney for Appellees
Transcontinental Oil & Gas
and Cutter Oil Company
P.O. Box 488
Wooster, Ohio 44691-0488
Benita Kahn, Secretary
Oil & Gas Board of Review
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and
Pease
52 East Gay Street
P.O. Box 1008
Columbus, OH 43216-1008

KENNETH L. GIBSON
Attorney for Interested Parties
Bruce Doolittle and Philene Engel
ASSOCIAtED
LAW OFFICES
WEICK. GleSON & LOWRY
234 WEST PORTAGE TRAIL
CUYAHOGA FALLS. OHIO
44221
(216) 929-0507

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CIVIL DIVISION
FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO
BRUCE DOOLITTLE, et al.
Appellants

Case No. 94 CVF 02 839
Judge J. Bessey

v.
TRANSCONTINENTAL OIL & GAS, INC.,
et al.
Appellees

MOTION TO DISMISS AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

Now come Appellees, Transcontinental Oil & Gas, Inc., and Cutter Oil
Company, and move this Honorable Court to dismiss the appeal of Bruce
Doolittle and Philene Engel, as they are not real parties in interest and
have no standing to bring this appeal, and because National City Bank's
motion to intervene filed 72 days after the order of the Oil and Gas
Board of Review was entered does not constitute a timely perfected notice
of appeal pursuant to either Revised Code Section 119.12 or Revised Code
Section 1509.37.

A memorandum in support of this motion is attached.
Respectfully submitted,
CRITCHFIELD, CRITCHFIELD
& JOHNS ON
usan E. Ba r
Ohio Sup. t. #0059569
Attorney for Appellees,
Transcontinental Oil & Gas,
Inc., and Cutter Oil Company

CRITCHFIELD,
CRITCHFIELD
&JOHNSTON
ATTORNEVSAT LAW
225
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' \ O. BOX4S8

W ...
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12161264-4444

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
Statement of the Facts.
The property in question in this dispute is a 13 .48 acre parcel of
land

located

Doolittle

Engel's father
died

Bath

Summit

Township.

County.

Ohio

("Doolittle

In January of 1973. this property was titled in the name of

Property").
Gillum H.

in

testate

H.

("G.

Doolittle").

Bruce

Doolittle

(hereinafter "Doolittle" and "Engel").
on January

24.

1973.

G.

Testament provided that Akron National Bank

G.

Doolittle's

H.

and

Philene

Doolittle

H.

Last

Will

and

& Trust Company nka National

City Bank ("NCB") was to be and remains the co-executor under the Will
and

the

trustee

of

the

G.

Doolittle

H.

Trust

The

("Trust")

Will

provided that all property owned by G. H. Doolittle vested at the time of
his death in NCB.
hereof

as

A copy of the Will is attached hereto and made a part

Exhibit

1

The

terms

of

the

beneficiaries, Bruce Doolittle, Philene Engel,
G. H. Doolittle's two grandsons.

Trust

provide

of

the

estate

was

three

and a separate trust for

Legal title to the Doolittle Property

vested in NCB at the time of G. H. Doolittle's death.
inventory

for

filed,

the

Doo1i tt1e

At the time the
Property

was

inadvertently excluded from the inventory.
Sometime in April of 1991. NCB became aware of the Doolittle Property
and thereafter began negotiations with agents of Transcontinental Oil &
Gas.

Inc.. and Cutter Oil Company (hereinafter collectively referred to

as "Transcontinental") for the leasing of the Doolittle Property for the
purpose of composing a unit on which to drill an oil and gas well
CRITCHFIELD.
CRITCHFIELD
& JOHNSTON

On or

about December 12. 1991, NCB, as trustee, entered into a nondrilling oil
and gas lease with Transcontinental for the Doolittle Property

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
22!"

NO~TH

MARKET STREET

The

Doolittle

Property

I' O. BOX 48B

Wi...

was

unitized

with

other

leases

'::R. OH 4469 I w0488
12161 264-4444

Transcontinental had obtained,

and in February of 1992 Transcontinental

-2-

began drilling the DiTommaso Well No
Doolittle and Engel

filed

suit

in

After drilling was commenced,

1
the

Summit County Court

of

Common

Pleas, claiming a one-third interest each in the property, disputing the
validity

of

the

lease,

and

production of the well.

seeking

an

injunction

against

further

Transcontinental continued to drill the well to

total depth; but by agreement of the parties, the well was not completed
or put into production.

The case in Summit County is currently stayed

pending the outcome of this appeal.
Transcontinental

subsequently

requested

a

mandatory

pooling

order

from the Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas of the Ohio Department of
Natural

Resources

A hearing was

held before

the

Technical

Committee of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources,
and Gas, on June 15, 1992.
to

Advisory

Division of Oil

The Technical Advisory Committee recommended

the Chief that Transcontinental's request

for

mandatory pooling be

approved with the following provisions'

1.

The Doolittle acreage pool portions be comprised of 3 067
acres;

2.

The unit size be limited to
total size; and

3.

The standard pay-out provision of 150 percent cost recovery
be used.

On July 29,

and not exceed 24 acres

in

1992, the Chief issued an order denying Transcontinental's

request for a mandatory pooling.

On August 12, 1992,

Transcontinental

timely appealed from the Chief's order to the Oil and Gas Board of Review
(hereinafter "Board")
the Board.
CRITCHFIELD.
CRITCHFIELD
&JOHNSTON
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

as

A hearing was held on October 22,

1992, before

Appearances were made at that hearing by Doolittle and Engel

"interested

persons"

through

their

counsel,

Kenneth

Gibson.

On

January 20, 1994, the Board reversed the order of the Chief and granted

225 NORTH MARKET STREET

J
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Transcontinental's request for a mandatory pooling order, including 3 067

(216.264-4444

acres

of

the

Doolittle

Property

Although NCB did not

-3-

appear

as

an

interested person at the hearing before the Board, they were made aware
of all

the administrative proceedings by counsel for Trans cont inentaL-

When the order of the Board was issued on January 20, 1994, a copy of
that order was sent via facsimile transmission to NCB's counsel of record
in the Summit County case.

(See Affidavit of Susan E.

Baker attached

hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit 2 and Affidavit of Daniel H.
Plumly attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit 3.)

Law.
The court should dismiss the appeal of Doolittle and Engel because
they have no
parties

to

standing to bring this

the

administrative

cause

of action,

adjudicative

hearing

They were

before

the

not

Board.

Pursuant to Revised Code Section 1509.37, only parties may appeal from an
Parties are specifically defined by Revised Code

Order of the Board.

Section 1509.36 and Ohio Administrative Code
appellant

from

"interested

the

Chief's order and

persons"

before

standing as a party

the

Board

the

Section 1509-1-14 as

Chief.

does

the

Their appearance

not

bootstrap

them

The specific provisions of Revised Code

as

into

Section

1509.37 and Section 1509.36 should prevail over the general provisions of
appeals

from

state

Section 119.01.

administrative

agencies

set

forth

in Revised

Code

Revised Code Section 1. 21.

Even under the general provisions of Revised Code Section 119 01(A),
which defines a "party", Doolittle and Engel have no standing to appeal
Revised

Code

Section

119 01

defines

"party"

as

the

"person

interests are the subject of an adjudication by an agency."
CRITCHFIELD,
CRITCHFIELD
&JOHNSTON
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

whose

Doolittle

and Engel, by their own admission, have only an equitable title to some
portion of the Doolittle Property

The Trust holds legal title to the

:25 NPRTH MARKET STREET
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property and the trustee is the only person who can enter into an oil and

2161 264-4444

gas lease which transfers the mineral rights of the property
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[WJhere the testator devises real estate to a trustee, the
trustee upon his appointment takes title thereto which relates
back to the date of the death of the testator, and such trustee
is entitled to collect rents and profits from the real estate
after the death of the testator .
Barlow v. The Winters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co .. Trustee, 145 Ohio
St. 270, 276 (1945).
Absolute legal title vests in the trustee of a trust.

The equitable

title to real property vests in the beneficiaries of a trust.
v.

Finkbeiner,

III Ohio App

64 (Hamilton Co.

1959).

Finkbeiner

Only the legal

interests of the trustee and its ability to enter into an oil and gas
lease for the Doolittle Property will be affected by the outcome of any
appeal from the Board's Order
Doolittle and Engel's interests will be indirectly affected by the
amount of royalties the Trust is able to collect

They have no legal

interest to form a lease which would be directly affected by the order
They have only an equitable interest in the proceeds of the lease
Because they have no legal interest which will be directly affected,
Doolittle and Engel are not the real parties in interest, and therefore
have no standing to appeal.

"Every action shall be prosecuted in the

name of the real party in interest."

Civil Rule 17(A).

'Real party in interest' is one who has a real interest in
the subject matter of the litigation and not merely an interest
in the action itself, i. e., one who is directly benefitted or
injured by the outcome of the case.
West Clermont Ed. Ass 'n. v. West Clermont Bd. of Ed., 67 Ohio
App. 2d 160, 162 (Clermont Co. 1980). (emphasis in the original)
Only Doolittle and Engel's equitable interests in the proceeds of the
trust will be affected by the outcome of this case, because they have no
CRITCHFIELD
CRITCHFIELD
&.JOHNSTON
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

ability to enter a lease for the mineral rights to the Doolittle Property
As beneficiaries of the Trust, Doolittle and Engel may not bring this

225 "'JRTH MARKET STREET
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appeal in their own name

A beneficiary to a trust may not bring a cause

12161264-4444

of action

in his

own name,

but

must
-5-

first

make

a

demand upon

the

trustee.

Firestone v

Ga1braeth, 976 F 2d 279 (6th Cir. 1992).

trustee may bring an action on behalf of a trust.
40 Ohio St. 554 (l891).

Only the

Saxton v. Seiberling,

Doolittle and Engel have not made a demand that

NCB bring this appeal and they have no standing to bring a civil action
in their own name.
Despite the fact that they have no legal interest which is directly
affected by the order of the Board, Doolittle and Engel have persisted to
attempt

to elevate

themselves

to

the

level

of a party

in both

administrative proceedings below and this appeal to a court of law.
are not parties as defined by Chapter 1509.
defined by Chapter 119.
to Civil Rule 17(A).

the
They

They are not parties as

They are not the real party in interest pursuant
They do not even have a financial stake in this

litigation outside their equitable interests in the proceeds of the Trust
because,

as

is

reflected in the

record at

page 124 and 125 of

the

transcript of the hearing before the Board, their legal fees are being
paid by an oil and gas producer who is also represented by Doolittle and
Engel's counsel.

Doolittle and Engel have no standing to bring this

appeal and it should be dismissed.
This appeal should be dismissed because NCB's motion to intervene
does not constitute a timely perfected notice of appeal.
Code

Section

119.12

governs

generally

the

appeal

of

Ohio Revised
administrative

rulings and states in pertinent part:

CRITCHFIELD.
CRITCHFIELD
&-.JOHNSTON

Any party desiring to appeal shall file a notice of appeal
wi th the agency setting forth the order appealed from and the
grounds of his appeal. A copy of such notice of appeal shall
also be filed by the appellant with the court
Unless otherwise
provided by law relating to a particular agency, such notices of
appeal shall be filed within 15 days after the mailing of the
notice of the agency's order as provided in this section.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
~2S
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The statutes governing appeals from the Board provide for a
time for filing of a notice of appeal.

longer

Ohio Revised Code Section 1509.37

provides in pertinent part:
Any party adversely affected by an order of the Oil and Gas
Board of Review may appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of
Franklin County.
Any party desiring to so appeal shall file
with the Board a notice of appeal designating the order appealed
from and stating whether the appeal is taken on questions of law
or questions of law and fact. A copy of such notice shall also
be filed by the appellant with the court and shall be mailed or
otherwise delivered to the appellee.
Such notices shall be
filed and mailed or otherwise delivered within 30 days after the
date upon which appellant received notice from the Board by
registered mail of the making of the order appealed from.
NCB had notice of Transcontinental's appeal from the Chief's denial
of its mandatory pooling order request

Despite this notice, NCB failed

to appear at the hearing before the Board as an 1nterested person as
provided for

in Administrative

Code

Section 1509 -1-14

immediate notice of the order issued by the Board.

NCB

also had

Although NCB was not

a party to the appeal and did not appear as an interested person,
January 20,
the

order

counsel

for

when counsel for Transcontinental received a

1994,

of

the

Board

granting

Transcontinental

Board's order.

its

request

transmitted via

for

copy of

mandatory

facsimile

a

on

pooling,

copy

of

the

Despite actual knowledge of all of the administrative

adjudicative procedures involving this drilling unit,

NCB has failed to

appear as an interested person at either the technical advisory committee
hearing or

the

appeal before

the

Board

and did not

appeal

from

the

Chief's order denying the mandatory pooling order
NCB has failed to properly perfect an appeal from an order of the
CRITCHFIELD.
CRITCHFIELD
& JOHNSTON

Board.

It has sent no notice to Transcontinental, who is a proper party,

nor has it sent notice to the Board.

NCB has only moved to intervene 72

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
225 -.JJTH MARKET STREET

days after the order was issued by the Board

O.80X488

WO.:-

Such delay should estop

C::R. OH 44691-0488
1216.264-4444

NCB from exercising any right it may have

-7-

to app.eal

from the

Board's

order.

NCB cannot circumvent procedure by now deciding to ride in on the

coattails of Doolittle and Engel who, although they had no standing, did
at

least

comply

with

the

statutory

requirements

to

perfect

their

attempted appeal.
Even

if

NCB

had

timely perfected

its

appeal,

NCB

does

not

have

standing to bring an appeal from this order for the same reasons that
Doolittle and Engel have no standing.
Revised

Code

1509-1-14.

Section

1509.36

NCB is not a "party" as defined by

and

Its failure to appeal,

Ohio

Administrative

Code

Section

even as interested parties,

although

it could have appealed the Chief's order and been a party, indicates its
intent to waive any administrative remedies it might have employed.

Its

failure to exhaust or even attempt to exercise any of its administrative
remedies bars it from even the bootstrap argument of Doolittle and Engel
to establish standing to appeal
There is a need for closure to adjudication and a need fora point at
which

the

parties may rely on the

final

ruling of

the

Transcontinental will be prejudiced if the Court denies
dismiss

this appeal.

agency

Only

its motion to

Doolittle and Engel's equitable interests

in the

proceeds of the Trust are protected in their suit in Summit County Court
of Common Pleas.

Their legal fees are being paid by another client of

their counsel.
NCB

has

affirmatively

administrative proceedings.

elected

not

to

participate

in

the

It has failed to exhaust its administrative

remedies.
CRITCHFIELD.
CRITCHFIELD
&JOHNSTON

Neither Doolittle nor Engel nor NCB has standlng to bring an appeal
from the

Board's order.

from

Chief's

NCB,

having notice and opportuni ty to

appeal

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
?2S

"'5"
RT. H

MARKET STREET

O. BOX 488

No\:

the

order waived its

opportunity to become

a

party

It

_R, OH 44691-0488

12161264-4444

should not be permitted to use Doolittle and Engel's inappropriate appeal

-8-

to toll the statute of limitations on the time in which it could arguably
have properly perfected an appeal.
The time has come when Transcontinental should be able to rely upon
the final administrative adjudicative order of- the Board.

Based on the

foregoing law and argument,

this court should dismiss the appeal and

affirm

Oil

the

order

of

the

and

Gas

Board

of

Review

granting

Transcontinental's request for a mandatory pooling order.
CRITCHFIELD

Susan E. B
Ohio Sup. t
Attorney for Appellees,
Transcontinental Oil & Gas,
Inc., and Cutter Oil Company
P o. Box 488
Wooster, OH 44691-0488
Phone. 216/264-4444
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion and Memorandum

I}J

of Law was mailed by regular u. S. Mail this ~ day of April, 1994, to
the following:

1.

Donald L. Mason, Esquire
Chief Division of Oil and Gas
Department of Natural Resources
4435 Fountain Square, Bldg. A
Columbus, OH 43224-1387

2.

Ray Studer, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General
4435 Fountain square, Bldg. A
Columbus, OH 43224

3.

Ms. Benita Kahn, Secretary
Oil and Gas Board of Review
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease
52 East Gay Street
P.O. Box 1008
Columbus, OH 43216-1008

4.

Kenneth L. Gibson, Esquire
Attorney for Bruce Doolittle and Philene Engel
234 Portage Trail
P.O Box 535
Cuyahoga Falls, OH 44222

CRITCHFIELD.
CRITCHFIELD
&JOHNSTON
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
~2S N.ORTH MARKET STREET

O.aOX4S8

We..

)

_R. OH 44691-0488
~2161

264-4444
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5.

Ronald E. Kopp. Esquire
Attorney for National City Bank
Roetzel & Andress
75 East Market Street
Akron, OR 44308-2098

CRITCHFIELD,
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& JOHNSTON
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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THE COURT

or COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO
CIVIL DIVISION

~

DOOLITTLE. et sill

]

Appellant.

1

)

CASE NO. MCVlO2-839

]

JUDGE BESSEY

SCOJtiITINENTAL on. & GAS,
~aL

1

Appellees.

~7

DECISION

Rendered Ibis

...\

..,......, ,

-. ,_ ....

(,i)
--"

. -.

~ ~a1 of November, 1'94.

Bessey. J.
This ~a5e is before the Court on an R.C. 11509.37 appeal from the Decision of the
Oil &: Ou Review Bozmi gmnting a mandatoly pooling order to Appellee. The Boud·s

Decision reversed the Order of the QUe! of the Division of Oil and Gas which had denied
the request for mandator)' pooling.
The Court is confined to the record pxesented at the Board Qcept under the

following cimunstances:
liThe court may grant a teQ.uest for the admission of additional evidence when satisfied

that sucb additional evid~ is newly discovered and could Dot with reasonable diligeQ(;:e
have been ascertained prior to the hearing befate the board." R.C. flS~.J1.

The case· file in the within cause contains affldaviES, depositions. ex parte
communications by letter to the Count and allegations within the briefs which are!neither
newly discovered nDT contained within the l'Ccord fnun the Board. To a great e~lent they
~ 1O the Icla~ case pending

in Summit County Common Pleas Court between

.

,

...
..~

~,'

Appellants and Intervenors in rhis case.

They complicate the issues

UDJ~ecessarUy- The only issue. before this

Court is whedlcr the Order of th

Board iJ lawful and r:easonaJ;,le. R.C. '1S09.3'7. For the foUovring reasons

detennined that it is nol On September 6. 1994. mter\'enor withdrew its a

The property involved Is located in Bath Township, Ohio. The pOIti
Board orowed to be pooled is 3.067 acres of

It

13.48 acre uaot 'Which w

GiUum H. Doolittle. DOW~. Doolittle died restate leaving the pro
chiJchcn and his two grandchildren. Each child (the Appcllams herein) was to xeceive a
1/3 interest and the gramlchi1dreD

~h

received a 1/6 intaest 'Which was to be held in

wst by the trustee National City Bank (NCB)- However. the title to the property never
passed to the beneficiaries. but rather was listed as ,till being owned by Doolittle.
In 1991, Appellee. Transcontinental Oil &: Ga~ Inc. (TOO). sought a lease
cQooerning oil and gas rights on the Doolirtle property. It was ultimately c:Dlaed into

by

NCB as trustee on ~mbet 12, 1991. NCB did not advise Appellants that they were

takinl this action. Befote the lease was signed, TOG obtained

a permit to drill

an oU

well near &he Doolittle property in anticipation of the execution of the lease. In February,
1992l th" ~1l

was drilled to depth.

After the well was sta.rtcd. but before it was drilled

to total depth. TOO bcame awate that NCB was DOW questioning itS au.thority 10 enter
in~ the lease a8 trU$tee because Doolittle and Engel (the children of Gillum Doolittle)

had

voiced objec;tions. TOG ~ed to drill to depth" cased. and eapped the weJ1. TOO
then attempted fo negotiate a ,\,oluntary pooling agreement with Doolittle aDd Engel bu~
was unsuccessful. It then appUed for a mandatory pooling order on June IS. 1992. The

Chief denied the request on July 29, 1992. The Oil & Gas Review Board held its hearing

2

on the ob~tions of TOe on October 22, 1992, but did not issue its Order granting the
mmda~ pooling

request until January 21. 1994.

It.c. ,1509.215Cts out the pren;quisites fw a mandaloty pooling order;
IIIf a tract of land is of insufficient size or shape to meet the
requirements fot driDing a well thexeon u provided in
section 1509.24 or 1$09.25 of the R.evJsed Code, whichever
is applicable. and th~ owner has been unable for fonn a
dril1in8
under agreement provided in section 1509.26
of the Jteyised Code. on a just and equitable basis. the
owner of such rract may make application to the division of

=t

aU and gas far a mandatoty pooling order.
Such application shall include such data amI information as
sball be reasonably required by th~ cbief of the division of
aU and gas and shall ~ accompanied by an application for

permit as required by section 1509.05 of the Revised Code.
The chief shall notify all owners of land within the area
proposed. to be included within the order of the flling of
such application and of their tight to a bearing if requested.
Afict the hearing or after the ex:piration of thirty days from
th,,, slate notice of application was mailed fa such oVincrs.
the chief, if satisfied that the applicarion is proper in fann
and that rnaJld.alOI'y pooling is necessary to protect
oorrelative rights or to provide effecrive development. usc.
or conservation of oil and gas, shall issue a dri11iDg pe.anit
and a mandator)' pooling order complying with the
requirements for drilling a weD as provided in section
1509.24 or 1.509.25 of the Revised Code. whichever is
applicable. which shall:
(A) Designate the boundaries of the drilling unil within

which the well shall be drilled;
(B) Dcsigraate the proposed drilling site;

(C) Deaaibe each separately owned
pooled by the orner.

tnct or pan thereof

(0) Allocflte on a &\lJ'faee acreage basis .. pro I.ta portion
of the production to the ownel at e&ch tract;
(.6) Designate the pason to whom dle permil shall be

issued.

3

Thus, 'Under the scatole, there are two prerequisites to a mandatot)' pooling order:
L 'I'h8 tract: of land must be of insufflcie.ut size or shape
without mcludinl the land sought to be pooled.

2. The developer must bave been unsuccessful in his
.ttempts 10 get voluntary pooling agreements.
]olmso" "', Kel( (1993), " Ohio AJlp.,34 6ZJ.
The evidence presented to the Board through Mr.

Craddock indicated that there

was another tract at land which TOG had ~viCl1s1)' leased which would have been a site

which was slJfficient in Jize and &bapc to accommodate the wen. This is the McCann
property. This should have been the end of the inquiry since the fll'st prerequisite for

mandatory pooling was not mel
While the Board in iu opinion recognized the fact that the McCann propertY was

sufficient in sif.e and shape., it found that ffl(;t to be irrelevant sin~ TOG had alrciUly.gone
to the expense of drilling the

_en on the Doolittle ptopmy.

The Board considered the

site and shape of the u.ct of land on which the well had been drilled without the
Doolittle ptopeny in granting the mandatory pooling order. This is contrary to the statute

which requires that the application for mandatory pOQlin1 accompany the permit to drill
the weU. It was not meant to protect those who drill a well improperly. The Board.

exceeded its authority in at1empting to mitigate the dama.ges that TOG would surfer. It
also did not consider the advta'5e effect the ute of only three

ill

me

~es

of the 13

~ontained

Doolittle property would have on Appellants. For that teascn alonc. it did not

pro~t

Appellants cottelativ8 ripts in violation of the ,raNte. I"h"",tl, 89 Oldo

Ap,.34 til 621.l&.

S

In fairness to TOO, it did not anticipate needing mandar.ory pooling

since it believed it had a valid lease with NCB. It was at the point that the Appellants

4

questlcmed die iQ6rutit)' of die

"usa to c,,"= the lease !hat tbe SlIiIlIDit CettHty ease

had to have been resolved. That col11t bas the only juxisdiction to decide 'those mattcas
and the Chief and the Board bod! c"ceeded their &\1thority in eonstderlDg the legali~ of

the lease.

TOG, absent an injunction against usc of the well, could have begun

production.. There was no need to go to the Chief for a mandatory pooling order since
TOO already bad existing voluntary leases the invalidit)' of which had not bceu shown.
The Chief's teStimony

lit 1bc

hearing before the Board was that he beliC1r'eci there

'Was a Yalid lease in place a.s executed by the batlk.1

TOG should have operated under

that premise and ~ontinued drilling or resolved that lawsuit in th~ Summit County

COlTllUOn Plea! Cotln. The Ollef felt that the prerequisites were not there for mandatory

drilling since the lease had been cxecllted for the DooUtue property. The Chief should
DOl

have considered the legality of the lease. His only inquiIy should have beenwberher

or not there was • lease whioh made the tract Jarge enough to preclude mandatory
pooling. Neither the Board not this Court has an)' jurlsdi~tion to decide the legality of the
voluntary lease. 1ftat issue has to be resolved in Summit County. Thus. lhe dccfsion of

dIe Chief while c~t for the wrong reasons. was couect and lhe Board was inconect
in grantinS the IIWldatory pooling for reasons of good faim.
Since this Court has fOWld that the Board shoukl not have considered good faith,
i~ will not ~ifically discuss mose issues since they are

better left for Summit County.

This Coun does not intend In make issues not before it resj'udicata_ Cercainly. ~howevef,

there are issues which the Board did not address which were rdevant to any good fajth

issue.
IThe Chief'5 opinion does not state this as his n:ascm for denying the mandatory
~1eS that TOG failed to show thaI shey could not obtain sufficient
1eues. lIis order is not deu what he means~ but his teStimony iDdiclre& that his research
revealed that the lease with the bank was valid.

pooling,. but rather

5

The decision of the Oil It Gas Boud is REVERSED. At she time the mandatoJy

pooting request was made there were leases in effect, valid or not. which pJOvided a tract
of land large enough to pzobibit the involuntary taking of Jand. The validity of the lease

must be ~terrnilled in Summit County CommoJl Pleas Coutt.

If the

l~

are deemed invalid, there was 8J1other trK£ of land. the McCann

propeny, on which the weD ~ou1d ha~ and .hould have been drilled. 1'his alone would

preclude the mandatory pool.inB of Appellanu' property.
Counsel for AppeUanT$ shall ~are and submit an appropriate Judgment

Entry reflecting this Decision pursuant to Loc. Itc. 25.01 and 25.02.

Appearances:

Ronald ·S. Kopp. Esq.
Scott Sa.1sbwy. Esq.
Counsel for Appellant
Kenneth L. GIbson, Esq.
CoUD$e1 for Appellants
Daniel H. PIQ:m1y, Esq.

Susan Suer. Esq.
Counsel for Appellees
Jeffrey T. Knoll. Esq.
Leonard W. Staufl'enger, Esq.
Coun$d fen: Appellants
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO
NATIONAL CITY BANK, NE,
Appellant,

JflJMINATION NO (/

..

DY fiJlC

CASE NO.

v.
RICHARD J. SIMMERS,
ACTING CHIEF, DIVISION OF
OIL" GAS, OHIO DEPARTMENT
OF NATURAL RESOURCES,

94CV1I"-::m~I-'7"~-':'-

------

----

___.

JUDGE TRAVIS

Appellee.

Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas. Pursuant to Local Rule
39.01, upon the filing of this appeal, appellant was provided with a copy of the case
scheduling order which set forth the briefing schedule and date of submission of this
case to the court for decision. Pursuant to the case scheduling order, the record
was to be filed on or before June 2, 1994; appellant's brief was due by July 17, 1994;
appellee's brief by July 28, 1994; appellant's reply brief, and the date of submission
to the court for decision, August 4, 1994.
Appellant failed to file a demand for the record of proceedings. As. a
result, no record has been filed. No briefs have been filed. Therefore, this appeal
is DISMISSED for want of prosecution at appellant's costs.

) C;--~.

--

::..;

"

Copies to:
~-

Ronald S. Kopp, Esq.
Scott Salsbury, Esq.
Counsel for Appellant
Richard J. Simmers
Acting Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas

-'

'--

--_ ...

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO
NATIONAL CITY BANK, NE,
Appellant,

v.
RICHARD J. SIMMERS,
ACTING CHIEF, DIVISION OF
OIL &: GAS, OHIO DEPARTMENT
OF NATURAL RESOURCES,

··
·

·
··

CASE NO.

1fl1MINATIOrJ NU....'I
Oy f}J1C--_._ _-----__

94CV1P-::M~IJ1"-'-

JUDGE TRAVIS

Appellee.
ENTRY
This is an appeal pursuant to R. C. 119.12, from an order of the Ohio
Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas. Pursuant to Local Rule
39.01, upon the filing of this appeal, appellant was provided with a copy of the case
scheduling order which set forth the briefing schedule and date of submission of this
case to the court for decision. Pursuant to the case scheduling order, the record
was to be filed on or before June 2, 1994; appellant's brief was due by July 17, 1994;
appellee's brief by July 28, 1994; appellant's reply brief, and the date of submission
to the court for decision, August 4, 1994.
Appellant failed to file a demand for the record of proceedings. As a
result, no record has been filed. No briefs have been filed. Therefore, this appeal
is DISMISSED for want of prosecution at appellant's costs.

) C;-~

--

I::""
~

'.

Copies to:
Ronald S. Kopp, Esq.
Scott Salsbury, Esq.
Counsel for Appellant
Richard J. Simmers
Acting Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas
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,
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY" OHIO

CIVIL DIVISION
BRUCE DOOLmLE. et aI.

]

Appe1lant.

]

I

YS.

TIlANSCONTINENTAL on.. & GAS,
INC., et aL
]

CASE NO. 94CVF02-839

JUDGE BESSEY

1

Appellees.

. -.

DECISION
Rendered thit

~ ~a,. or November

~

r

7

1994.

Bessey; J.
This ~8se is b=forc the Court on an R.C. '1509.37 appeal from the Decision of the
Oil &: Ou R.eview Boud granting a mandatory PQoling order to Appellee. The Boud's

Ded.sion reversed the Order of the Olief of the Division of on and Gas which had denied

me request for mandatory pooling.
1lle Court is confined to the record ptesented at the Board ~cept under the

fonowing circumstances:
ItThe court may gratlt a Mquest for the admission of additional evkience when satisfied
that such additional evidcna: is newly discoYeted and could Dot with reasonable diligen<:e
have been ascertained prior to the hearing before the board." R.C. ,1509..31.
'l"ho, case file in the within «USC ~Qntains affida"iu, depositions. ex

parte

communications by letter to the Court. and allegations within the briefs which are ineither
newly diSCOVered nor conWned wilhin the ~rd from the Board. To a great e:xsent they
pciI1aiu ~ the tell~ case pending in Summit County Common Pleas Court between

••

....

.,
,---

"";.

.'

AppdlanlC and InterVenors in r.hia case.

They compHcate the issues in this case

unAeCeSsarily- The only issue before this Court is whether the Ordet of the Oil & Oas
Board is lawful and reasonable. R.C. flS09.37.For the following reasons this Comt bas

dctennined that it is nol On September 6, 1994, Jn1et\'eI1Of withdrew its appeal
The property involved is loc:ated in Bath Township, Ohio. The portion which me
Board ordered to be pooled is 3.067 ac:te. of a 13.48 aere U'aQt W'hich. was owned by

GiUum H. Doolittle. DOW deQeased. Doolittle died testate leaving the property to his two
children and his two graMchildml. Each child (the Appellanu berein) was to receive a
1/3 interest and the gr8lldchildren e~h received a 1/6 interest -hich was to be held in

mzst by the ttustoo National City Bank (NCB). However. the title to the prQPerty ntvtr
passed to the beneficiarle5. but ratbel' was listed as still being owned by Doolittle.
In 1991, Appellee, Transcontinental Oil &: Gas. Inc. (TOO), sought a lease

r;;c)ncem.ing oil and gas rights on the DoolirtJe property. It was ultimately cnrc:red into by
NCB as iIustee on December 12, 1991. NCB did not advise Appellants that the"y were

taking this action. Before the lease was signed, TOG obtained a permit to drill an oil
well near the Doolittle property in anticipation of the execution of the lease. In February,

m. th~ ~11 was drilled to depth.

1

.0

After the well WI$ started. but before it was drilled

total depth, TOO bcame awate fhat NCB waS DOW questioning its authorlty to enter

infO the lease as trU$tee because Doolittle and Engel (the children of Gillum DoolitUe) had
voiced objec1ions. TOG proeeeded to drill to depth. cased, and Qpp:d the well TOO

then aUetnpteci to negotiate a 'Voluntary pooling agreement with Doolittle and Engel but
was unsua:es5fu1. It then appUed for a mandatol1 pooling order on June IS. 1992. 'The
Chief denied the request on July 29, 1992. The Oil & Gas Review Board held its hearina

z

on the obFtions of TOC on October 22,

1992~ but did

not iSsue its Order gtanti.o.g the

mmdatDJ)' pooling request until Ianuuy 21. 1994.

It.c. ,15(19.21 sets out the prerequisites for a mandatory poolin.S order:
IIIf a tracr. of land is of insufficient si%e or shape to meet the
requirementS for driUiug a well thereon u provided in
section 1509.24 or 1$09.25 of the R.e\'1sed Code, whichever
is applicable. IJ1d the owner has been unable for fozm a
drilling lPIit under agreement provided. bl section 1509.26
of the !tevised Code. on a just and equitable basis, the
owne.r of such uact mal' make application to the division of
oll and gas for a mandatoxy pooling Older.
Such applieation shall indude such data and information as
shall be reasonably required by the cbief of the division of
on and ,as and shall ~ accompanied by an applkation for
permit as required by section 1509.05 of the ReviscdCode.
The chief shall notify aU owners of land withio the area
proposed to be included within the order of the filing of
such application and of their tight to a bearing if requested.
After Ule hearing or after the expiration of thirty days from
thL' .slate Dotice of application was mailed to such owners,
the chief. if satisfied that the applicariol1 is proper in fann
and that marulatoty pooling is necessary to protect
oorrelative rights or to provide effective development. use.
or conservation of oil and gas, shall issue a dri11i.a8 pennit
and a mandatory pooling order complying with the
requirements for drilling a weD as provided In sc:dion
1509.24 or 1.509.25 of the Revised Code. whichever is
applicable. which shall:
(A) Designate the boundaries of the drilling unit within
which lhe well shall be drilled;
(B) Dcsigl'6lte the proposed drilling site;
(C) Describe each se,parate1y owned tract or pan meteof
pooled by the otde.r;

(0) AUoc$te 011 a $\lJ'face acreage basis a pro I.ta portion

of the production to the owner of each tract;
(E) Designate the
issued.

pa50D to

3

whom the permit shall be

Thus, l,mder the &tata!e, there are two prerequisites to a mandatory pooling order:
L 1'he tract of land must be of inlllfflClent

size 01 shape

without mcluding the land sought to be peoled.
2. The deYelopcr most have been unsuccessful in his
_ttempts 10 get 'folunrary pooJing agreements.
}Q1uJSon "r KeB (19931 I' Ohio App.34 623.
The cvidcacc presented 10 me Board through Mr. Craddock indicated that there
was another tract of land which TOG had pn:vicusly leased which would have been a site

which was s\lfficient in me and $hapc

to

accommodate the well. This is the McCann

property. This should have been the end of the inquiry sin~ the

rust prerequisite for

mandatory pooling was not mel
While the Board in its opinion recognized the fact that the McCann property was
sufficient in siu and shape.. it foWld that fact to be irrelevant sinc;c TOG had alretdy.gone
to the expense of drilling the well on the Doolittlt::: ptopc:rty. The Board considered the

site and shape of the u.ct of land on which the well had been drilled witbout the
Doolittle property in granting the mandatoty pooling order. Thi.t is contrary to the statute
which requires that the application. for mandator)' pooJin' accompany th8 permit to drill
the well. It was not

meant to

protect those who drill a well improperly. The. BDard

exceeded hs audlority in attempting to mitigate the damages that TOG would surfer. It
also did not consider the adverse. effect the use of only three aq-es of the 13 coptained

ill the Doolittle property would have en Appellants. For that reason alone. it did not
prQ~t Appellants

A".3d 41 621.U.

lt

cottelativs ripts In violation of tho etaNte.

}0'll1l6O".

8901t1D

In fairness to TOO, it did not anticipate needioS mandlltoIy pooling

since it believed i~ bad a valid leJSe with NCB. It WAS at the point that the Appellants

4

quesdbtiiSd the iQdlwitl of the cum.et to eMXute the lease tftaf the-San.mt ee\tftty ease
had to hive been resolved. That co\1It bas the only jurlsdiction to decide lhose matte:rS
and the Chief and me Board bodl e"ceeded their a\lthority in considering die legality of

the lease.

TOG, absent an injunction against use of the ~el1, could have begun

production.. There was DO need to go to the Chief for a mandatory pooling order since
TOO already had existing voluntary leases the invalidity of which had not ba::u shown.

The Chiers testimony at the hearing before the Board was that he beliC\'ed there
was a valid lease in place as executed by the bank.l

TOO should have operated under

that premise and I;ontinued drilling or resolved that lawsuit in the Summit County
Common Pleas Coun. The dUef felt tha.t the prerequisites were not there for mandatoty
drilling since the lease had beea exccuted for the Doolitue property. The Chief should
not have considexed the legality of the lease. His only inquiIy $hould have been wb.erher

or not

th~

was a lease which made the

flaGt

Jarge enough to preclude mandatory

pooling. Nelthet the Board nat this Court has any jurlsdi~tion to decide the legality of the

voluntary lease. That issue has to be resolved in Summit County. Thus. lhe dccfsion of

die Chief while correct for the wrong reasons. was cottect and Ihe Board was inconcct

in granting the mandatory pooling fot reasons of good faim.
Since thjs Court has found that th~ Board should not have considered good faith,
if. will not speQficllly discuss those issues since they are better left for Summit County.

1bis Coun does not intend to make issue$ not before it resjudicaia. Certainly. howev~,
there are issues which the Board did not address whkb were relevant to any BQOd faith

issue.
l1be Chic:fs opmion does not Jta1c this as his reason for denying the mandatory
pooling,. but rather &tateS that TOO failed [0 show thaI shey could not obtain luffi~ient
1cueB. I1is order is not cle..r what he means, but his testimony indicares that his research
revealed that the lease with the baDk was valid.
5

The dedsioD of tho Oil & Gas Board is REVERSED. At the time the mandatory

p!;JOling request WIs mad~ there were lease. in ~ valid or not, which pIOvided a ttact
of land large onough to pmhibit the inVOllDltary raking of Janel. The validity of the lease

musl be determined in Summit County Commoll Pleas Coutt.
If the

l~

are deemed invalid., there was Bl'lother trlK:t of land. the McCann

propett;y, on which the well t;ould ha~ and should have been drilred. This alone would
predude the maadatory pooliq of Appellanbl' property.
Counsel for AppeUanu &hall prepare and submit an appropriaU! ludgmeD[

Batty reflecting this Decision pursuant to Loc. IU. 25.01 and 2.S.02.
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